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Summary 
 
This report investigates the financial implications for older people of the differences 
between the social care funding systems of England, Wales and Scotland. It considers how 
illustrative older people (vignettes) needing social care would be affected if the funding 
systems of Wales or Scotland were implemented in England, contrasting that with the 
effects of the reforms to long-term care funding due to be introduced in England in 2020. 
 
Scotland and to a lesser extent Wales have long-term care funding systems that are more 
generous than the system currently in operation in England. However, from 2020 the 
reforms planned for England will put a cap on an individual’s liability to pay towards their 
care. 
 
The main findings of the analysis presented in this report are: 
 
 Compared with the current English system, a Scottish style system of ‘free personal 
care’, the Welsh system, and the reforms due to be implemented in England in 2020 
are all more generous. 
 The benefits of implementing these systems in England would go to people who are 
not eligible for state support with their care costs – or eligible for support with only 
part of those costs under the current English system. 
 The benefits of a Scottish style free personal care system depend on the level of non 
means-tested state contribution to care home fees. Under the lower of two levels 
examined, the lifetime benefits of free personal care might not be any higher than 
the benefits of the planned English reforms for median earning home-owners. 
 The comparisons of the different funding systems depend on the length of time for 
which individuals need care – especially high intensity home care or residential care. 
 The Welsh system, which has a maximum weekly charge for home care, can be more 
beneficial than the English reforms for people who need only home care. 
 The English reforms produce benefits on a par with a Scottish-style system of free 
personal care only for people who need care long enough to benefit from the cap 
on care costs. 
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Introduction 
 
In the UK, publicly-funded health and social care services are devolved functions: each of 
the countries of the UK can and has pursued its own policy on the funding of adult social 
care. The main divergence between the countries occurred following the report in March 
1999 of the Royal Commission on Long Term Care of the Elderly (Royal Commission 
1999). As a result, the extent to which older people assessed as needing social care are 
required to pay towards its cost varies across England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. 
 
The Royal Commission recommended that personal care should be free at the point of 
use1. Only Scotland implemented this recommendation. Since 2002 personal care for older 
people in Scotland has been free in their own homes and attracts a non means-tested 
contribution in care homes. Help with domestic tasks at home and accommodation and 
living costs in care homes (‘hotel’ costs) remain subject to a means test. 
 
The aim of this note is to investigate the financial implications for older people of 
differences in the social care funding systems of England, Wales and Scotland2. To do this 
we consider how illustrative older people (vignettes) needing social care would be affected 
if the funding systems of Wales or of Scotland were implemented in England, contrasting 
that with the effects of the English reforms planned for 2020. The analysis uses the same 
illustrative vignettes as our first report (Adams et al. 2015).  
 
The Social Care means tests in England, Scotland and Wales 
 
Although there are differences in which components of care costs are means-tested, the 
structure of the means tests, where they are applied, is broadly similar in England, Scotland 
and Wales (see Box 1). There are country variations in details (Tables A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix). Scotland, and to a lesser extent, Wales have more generous systems than 
England. Within each country Local Authorities (LAs) administer the means tests. 
National guidance is relatively prescriptive on how they charge for residential care. For 
home care it generally provides a ceiling on charges but LAs have discretion to be more 
generous. 
 
England plans to introduce substantial reforms in 2020 as discussed in our previous 
overview report (Adams et al. 2015) and briefing note (Hancock et al. 2016). The key 
change is the introduction of a life time cap on an individual’s liability to pay towards their 
care costs on the lines recommended by the Commission on the Funding of Care and 
Support (CFCS 2011). To benefit from the lifetime cap, a person will have to be assessed 
by a LA as having eligible care needs. The LA will then calculate the weekly costs of 
meeting those needs and keep track of the cumulative amount of those costs through the 
                                                 
1 It also recommended that nursing care in care homes should not be subject to charges. Nursing care 
provided under the NHS has always been free at the point of use but public support for any element of 
care home fees attributable to the costs of nursing had been subject to a means test along with rest of the 
care home fee. All four UK countries accepted that this was anomalous and implemented a non means-
tested NHS nursing care contribution (albeit at different levels) for those assessed as needing nursing care 
in a care home. 
2 In this note we do not consider Northern Ireland in detail, where the means tests for residential care are 
similar to those in England and Wales but charges for home care have traditionally been low (Law Centre 
(NI) 2015). 
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person’s ‘Care Account’. Until their Care Account reaches the cap, the LA will still apply 
a means test to determine how much the person must pay towards the cost of their assessed 
needs. Once the cap is reached, the state will meet the cost of their eligible care needs 
without a means test. The daily living (or ‘hotel’) costs component of care home fees will 
continue to be means-tested. The reforms also increase substantially the upper capital limit 
in residential care for all except home owners where the value of their home is disregarded. 
  
 
  
Box 1: General structure of current means tests for residential and home care 
for older people in England, Scotland and Wales 
 
In Scotland, means tests apply only to the hotel component of care home fees and 
domestic help (not personal care) provided to older people in their own home. In 
Wales a maximum charge is applied to home care charges after the means test has been 
applied. 
Residential care 
Care home residents with capital assets above an upper capital limit have to meet the 
means-tested component of their fees in full. If they own their home before moving 
into a care home, its value is usually included in assessed capital. Residents with assets 
below the upper limit must use all their income except a personal expenses 
allowance towards the relevant component of their fees. An assumed income from 
capital between a lower capital limit and the upper limit is added to assessable income. 
Home care 
An upper capital limit operates in a similar way for home care (excluding personal 
care in Scotland) but the value of the recipient’s home is disregarded. For those with 
capital below the limit, disposable income above the Pension Credit Guarantee 
Credit level† plus a buffer has to be used towards the means-tested part of their home 
care costs. As for residential care, an assumed income from capital between a lower 
and upper limit is included in assessable income. 
Treatment of disability benefits 
Throughout the UK, people with care needs may be eligible for one of two cash 
disability benefits – Attendance Allowance (AA) or Disability Living Allowance 
(DLA)‡. Receipt of these benefits can trigger increases in entitlements to Pension 
Credit. If someone receives help with care home fees from their LA, payments of AA, 
the middle or higher rate of the care component of DLA and the associated increase 
in Pension Credit cease. Thus in Scotland, anyone receiving free personal care in a care 
home, ceases to receive these disability benefits. Similarly under the English reforms 
due from 2020, someone paying the full cost of their care will cease to receive disability 
benefits on reaching the cap. 
 
† Pension Credit is a means-tested cash benefit for older people which aims to ensure their income 
does not fall below a minimum (Guarantee Credit) level. The level used in the home care means tests 
excludes any additions above the standard level, such as those for severe disability. 
‡ DLA is in the process of being replaced by Personal Independence Payment 
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Vignette analysis 
 
All vignettes reach State Pension age (SPa) in April 2016 which is 63 for women and 65 
for men. Their State Pension entitlements are calculated under the reformed State Pension 
system which has been implemented for people reaching SPa from 2016 (see Adams et al. 
2015). The vignettes have been chosen for illustrative purposes rather than to be 
representative of the cohort reaching SPa in 2016. Our analysis is limited to single people 
but also provides a guide to the situation for couples once one partner has died and the 
surviving partner requires care. The vignettes distinguish men and women and vary in their 
level of past earnings and private pension accumulation (which vary by gender). They also 
vary in the financial and housing wealth. Median and high earning vignettes are 
homeowners, whereas low earners are renters. The vignettes’ combination of earnings 
level, financial and housing wealth, pension accumulation and housing tenure are informed 
by analysis of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing. The vignettes all experience the 
same disability and care trajectories (Figure 1) involving a residential care home stay 
(without nursing care) of 4½ years. This is above the median observed in practice, but is 
used for illustrative purposes. If eligible for state help with residential care costs, the care 
home fee is taken to be the LA rate (lower than the fee they would pay as self-funders) but 
payment of AA ceases. The vignettes are described in more detail in the Table A3 in the 
Appendix. 
 
Figure 1: The projected pathway of gross care costs and Attendance Allowance 
(AA) assumed within the vignettes 
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To model the implications for each vignette of replacing the English care charging system 
with that operating in Wales, we replace the English capital limits, personal expenses 
allowance and home care charging buffer with their Welsh equivalents. The Welsh 
maximum weekly charge for home care (currently £60 per week) is then applied. In 
implementing a Scotland-style version of free personal care in England we assume that all 
care received at home is personal care and therefore is free. To determine the non means-
tested state contribution to care home fees under free personal care, hotel costs are set to 
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the 2015 equivalent of the level of hotel costs that are assumed to apply in 20203 when the 
English reforms are implemented4. The non means-tested contribution to care home fees 
is then derived as the difference between the LA fee rate for a non-nursing care place in a 
residential care home and this level of hotel costs. This results in a non means-tested 
contribution to care home fees of about £301 a week in 2015 and is used as a base case 
for implementing free personal care in England. However, it represents some 58% of the 
LA fee rate which is considerably more than the equivalent proportion (34%) in Scotland. 
An alternative non means-tested contribution is derived as 34% of the English LA fee rate. 
This less generous version of free personal care is used to test the sensitivity of the results 
to the level of non means-tested contribution to care home fees.  
 
The analysis that follows examines the cumulative state contribution to care costs over the 
remaining lifetimes of the vignettes under the current English funding system, the 
reformed English funding system, the Welsh and Scottish systems. It also compares 
lifetime capital depletion under each system, since concerns that older people may have to 
use up large portions of their savings to pay for care underlies the English funding reforms. 
All money values are expressed in 2015 prices. Assumptions on future growth in the 
Consumer Price Index, GDP deflator and the ‘triple lock’ for uprating State Pension levels 
have been taken from the latest Office for Budget Responsibility projections (OBR, 2015 
and 2016). The Welsh maximum charge and the non means-tested contribution to care 
costs in care homes under free personal care are assumed to rise over time in line with 
growth in care costs. Other assumptions are as set out in Adams et al. (2015) and include 
real growth in the unit costs of care and in house values. 
  
                                                 
3 The equivalent of £12,000 a year (£230.77 per week) in 2016 prices, as originally planned for 
implementation in 2016 prior to postponement of the reforms to 2020. 
4 Care home fees in England are considerably higher than in Scotland so it would not be appropriate 
simply to use the Scottish level of this contribution, currently £171 per week. 
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The financial implications for older people of implementing 
the Scottish or Welsh long-term care funding systems in 
England 
 
There would be few consequences for the low earning vignettes (vignettes 1 and 2) of 
implementing the more generous Welsh or Scottish long-term funding systems. Indeed as 
we showed in our overview report, these vignettes are also largely unaffected by the 
introduction of the cap on long-term care costs planned for 2020. Because of their low 
levels of income and wealth, they are entitled to have all or most of their care costs met 
from public funding under the current English system. The remainder of this note 
therefore focuses on the higher earning/higher wealth vignettes.  
State contribution to care costs 
For all median and high earning vignettes, the base case implementation of free personal 
care results in the highest lifetime levels of state contribution to care costs while the current 
English system provides the lowest levels (Figures 2 to 4). The second highest level of 
lifetime state contribution to care costs is generally the reformed English system with its 
cap on lifetime costs. An exception is the high earning male homeowner for whom state 
contributions towards care costs are virtually identical under the Welsh system and the 
reformed English system by the end of the assumed care trajectory (Figure 4). This is 
because high earners are liable for most of their home care costs under the English reforms 
but have them limited to £60 per week under the Welsh system. Indeed for the median 
earning male homeowner, state support for care costs is higher under the Welsh than under 
the reformed English system at earlier points on the care trajectory although by the end of 
the care trajectory the reformed English system delivers higher lifetime state contributions 
(Figure 2). This highlights the importance of the duration of care needs. For those who do 
not have care needs for long enough to benefit from the cap on care costs, the Welsh 
maximum weekly charge on home care is more beneficial.  
 
Figure 2: For the median earning male homeowner, free personal care provides the 
highest level of lifetime state contribution to care costs, while the Welsh system 
provides a higher contribution than the current English system. 
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Figure 3: Free personal care also provides the highest level of state contribution to 
care costs for the median earning female homeowner but the Welsh and current 
English systems provide almost identical levels. 
 
 
Figure 4: For the high earning male homeowner, the Welsh system and the 
reformed English system provide similar levels of state support for care costs by 
the end of the care trajectories, but the Welsh system provides higher levels earlier 
on. 
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Capital depletion 
 
Under the current English care funding system, older people with capital above the upper 
limit have to draw on that capital to meet care costs if their incomes are too low to cover 
care costs in full. The situation for the median earning female homeowner, who has a home 
worth £300,000 and other assets of £8,000 is illustrated in Figure 5. Under the current 
English system, and also the Welsh system, she has to use nearly £90,000 (30%) of her 
capital to pay for her care. The English reforms will reduce this to just over £50,000 (17%). 
If free personal care was implemented in England, she would use up only £21,000 (7%) of 
her capital towards the hotel component of her care home fees.  
 
Figure 5: Capital depletion for the median earning female homeowner would be 
lowest under free personal care but would be the same under the Welsh system as 
the current English system. 
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The higher earning female homeowner, illustrated in Figure 6, (whose house is worth 
£400,000 and has £40,000 in savings) spends more of her capital on care than her median 
earning counterpart although the amounts represent lower proportions of her total wealth. 
The exception is free personal care where she uses up only half as much capital as the 
median earning female. This is because it is only hotel costs that have to be met, and she 
is able to pay for more of them from her income than the median earning female. For the 
high earning female the Welsh system results in lower capital depletion than the current 
English system. This is because she has savings (other than in the form of housing wealth) 
above the upper limit. Under the English system she is therefore liable for all her home 
care costs, whereas under the Welsh system she has to pay a maximum of around £60 per 
week. 
 
Figure 6: The high earning female homeowner depletes more of her capital than 
her median earning counterpart except under free personal care where she has to 
use only half as much. 
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Alternative implementation of a Scotland-style policy of free personal care  
 
The consequences of implementing a Scotland-style policy of free personal care depend 
on the level of non means-tested contribution to care home fees which would apply. The 
lower the level of that contribution, the higher the means-tested component of care home 
fees. Consider the median earning female homeowner (Figure 7). In the base case 
implementation of free personal care, the total lifetime state contribution to care costs is 
around £136,000 but under the alternative less generous implementation, it is only around 
£103,000 and is close to that provided by the reformed English system. For shorter care 
trajectories, however, even this less generous version of free personal care is more 
generous than the reformed English system.  
 
Figure 7: For median earning female homeowner, the less generous version of free 
personal care results in a similar lifetime state contribution to care costs as the 
English reforms. 
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The alternative implementation of free personal care also has implications for the extent 
to which the capital has to be drawn down to pay for care. Whereas under the more 
generous implementation the median earning female would need to deplete her capital by 
only around £20,000, under  the less generous implementation she would use up more 
than twice this amount (£56,000) and indeed that amount would be a little higher than 
under the reformed English system (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: The less generous version of free personal care more than doubles capital 
depletion compared with the more generous version for the median earning female 
 
For higher earners, even the less generous free personal care system provides more state 
support for care costs and leads to lower capital depletion than the English reforms. This 
is illustrated for the high earning male homeowner in Figure 9. 
= 
Figure 9: Even the less generous free personal care system depletes capital 
considerably less than the English reforms for the high earning male homeowner. 
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Conclusion 
Compared with the current English care funding system, the reforms due to be 
implemented in 2020, the Welsh system and the Scottish system are all more generous. 
The benefits of implementing these systems in England would go to people who are not 
eligible for state support with their care costs – or eligible for support with only part of 
those costs – under the current English system. The benefits of a Scottish style free 
personal care system depend on the level of non means-tested contribution to care home 
fees that would be adopted. Under the lower of the two levels examined in this note, the 
lifetime benefits of free personal care would not be any higher than the benefits of the 
planned English reforms which cap lifetime costs for the median earning female. However, 
they would exceed the benefits of the English reforms for higher earners. 
 
Box 2 provides a summary comparison of the different funding systems. The comparisons 
are dependent on length of time for which individuals need care – especially high intensity 
home care or residential care. The Welsh maximum weekly charge for home care can be 
more beneficial than the English reforms for people who need only home care. The 
English reforms introducing a cap on care costs produce benefits on a par with a Scottish-
style system of free personal care only for people who need costly care long enough to 
benefit from the cap. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Box 2: Overall comparison of the funding systems 
Where older people have savings substantially above the upper capital limit and/or high 
earnings the most advantageous system is: 
Personal care at home:  Scotland where such care is free 
Other care at home (e.g. domestic 
help): 
Wales where there is a maximum weekly 
charge 
Residential care for person with 
short expected length of stay: 
Scotland where there is a non means-tested 
contribution 
Residential care for person with 
long expected length of stay: 
Reformed England system under which the 
person will potentially benefit from the cap 
 
For older people with savings below the upper capital limit and modest incomes the 
same broad conclusions hold for home care.  The means tests in all countries result in 
such people contributing only towards the ‘hotel’ costs in residential care. So there is 
little difference in practice in what they would pay for residential care under each 
system.  
13 
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Appendix 
Table A 1: Charging rules for publicly-funded residential care for older people in England, 
Wales and Scotland, 2015/16 
 England, 
currently 
England from 2020 
(assumed money values 
expressed in 2015 prices) 
Wales Scotland 
Non means-tested 
state contribution 
(“free personal 
care”) 
None Once cap has been 
reached, difference 
between LA fee rate (less 
NHS nursing care 
contribution if relevant) 
and hotel costs (£318 per 
week. in 2020, expressed in 
2015 prices). 
None £171 per week 
Treatment of the 
value of the 
person’s home, 
after the first 12 
weeks in a care 
home. 
Taken into 
account unless 
occupied by 
partner or 
certain others 
Taken into account (unless 
occupied by partner or 
certain others) until cap 
reached and thereafter for 
‘hotel’ costs 
Taken into 
account 
unless 
occupied 
by partner 
or certain 
others 
Taken into account 
unless occupied by 
partner or certain 
others 
Lifetime cap on 
care costs 
None £75,420a in 2020, 
expressed in 2015 prices 
None None 
Hotel cost element None £ 263.50b per week in 2020 
expressed in 2015 prices 
None Difference between 
fee, free personal 
care contribution and 
NHS nursing care 
contribution (if 
relevant). 
Upper capital limit £23,250  £ 118,000b in 2020 
expressed in 2015 prices 
(for renters and 
homeowners where house 
value taken into account), 
£23,250 in other cases 
£24,000 £26,250 
Lower capital limit £14,250  £14,250 £24,000 £16,250 
Tariff on capital £1 per week per £250 capital between lower 
and upper limits 
None £1 per week per 
£250 capital between 
lower and upper 
limits 
Personal expenses 
allowance 
£24.90 per 
week 
£24.90 per week £25.50 per 
week 
£25.05 per week 
NHS nursing care 
contribution in a 
care home 
£112 per week £112 per week £140.90 
per week 
£78 per week 
a. Based in previously planned rate for 2016, converted to 2015 prices and then increased by assumed 
real earnings growth. 
b. Based on previously planned rate for 2016, converted to 2015 prices and then held constant in 2015 
prices. 
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Table A 2: Charging rules for publicly-funded social care provided to older people 
living in their own homes in England, Scotland and Wales, 2015/16.  
 England, 
currently 
England 
from 2020 
(assumed 
money 
values 
expressed in 
2015 prices) 
Wales Scotland 
Free personal 
care 
No No Yes: all assessed 
needs for personal 
care free for older 
in their own homes  
Life time cap 
on care costs 
None £75,420 in 
2020, 
expressed in 
2015 prices 
None None 
Maximum 
charge 
At the discretion of LAs, but 
assumed no maximum 
£60 per week At the discretion of 
LAsc  
Upper capital 
limit 
At discretion of local 
authorities; must be at least 
as generous as charging for 
residential care i.e.£23,250  
At discretion of local 
authorities; must be at 
least as generous as 
charging for residential 
care i.e. £24,000 
None c 
Lower capital 
limit 
At discretion of local 
authorities; must be at least 
as generous as charging for 
residential care i.e. £14,250  
£24,000.  
i.e. If capital is this 
amount or less it is 
disregarded and charge 
is based on income 
only (£60 maximum 
weekly charge) 
£10,000 
recommended c 
Assumed 
income on 
capital 
between lower 
and upper limit 
£1 per week per £250 capital None £1 per week per 
£500 capital 
recommended c 
Exempt 
disposable 
income (after 
meeting net 
housing costs) 
1.25 × Pension Credit 
Guarantee level a 
1.45b × Pension Credit 
Guarantee level 
1.165d × Pension 
Credit Guarantee 
level c 
Treatment of 
disability 
benefits in 
assessable 
income 
A disability related expenses element must be 
disregarded. Discretionary power to disregard 
disability benefits. 
A disability related 
expenses element 
should be 
disregarded. 
Discretionary 
power to disregard 
disability benefits c. 
a. £151.20 per week for a single person in April 2016 
b. Includes 10% above Pension Credit Guarantee level as a minimum allowance for 
disability related expenditure.  
c. Relevant only to domestic care since personal care at home is free of charge.  
d. Increased to 1.25 from 2016.  
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Table A 3: Vignette descriptions 
Vignette Description 
Single male, 
low earner  
Career: Retired aged 55 (early retirement due to ill health) 
Earning distribution: Low earner (30th Percentile)  
Home: 
     · Renter (£141 pw in 2016 prices, converted wo 2015 prices) 
     · Income linked council tax liability from ELSA 
Other financial wealth – Income linked from ELSA (£1,000 in 2016 prices) 
Single female, 
low earner  
Career: Career break aged 30 to 41, retirement aged 63 
Earning distribution: Low earner (30th Percentile)  
Home:  
    · Renter (£141 pw in 2016 prices, converted to 2015 prices) 
    · Income linked council tax liability from ELSA 
Other financial wealth – Income linked from ELSA (£1,000 in 2016 prices) 
Single male, 
median earner  
Career: Retirement aged 65 
Earning distribution: Median    
Home: 
    · Home owner (£300,000 in 2016 prices) 
    · Income linked council tax liability from ELSA 
    · Income linked  house price 
Other financial wealth – Income linked from ELSA (£8,000 in 2016 prices) 
Single female, 
median earner  
Career: Retirement aged 63 
Earning distribution: Median   
Home: 
    · Home owner (£300,000 in 2016 prices)  
    · Income linked council tax liability from ELSA 
    · Income linked house price 
Other financial wealth – Income linked from ELSA (£8,000 in 2016 prices) 
Single male, 
high earner 
Career: Retirement aged 65 
Earning distribution: High Earner (70th Percentile)  
Home: 
    · Home owner (£400,000 in 2016 prices) 
    · Income linked council tax liability from ELSA 
    · Income linked house price 
Other financial wealth – Income linked from ELSA (£40,000 in 2016 prices) 
Single female, 
high earner 
Career: Retirement aged 63 
Earning distribution: High Earner (70th Percentile)  
Home: 
    · Home owner (£400,000 in 2016 prices) 
    · Income linked council tax liability from ELSA 
    · Income linked house price 
Other financial wealth – Income linked from ELSA (£40,000 in 2016 prices) 
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